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Abstract 
After the ratification of NAFTA, the Central American countries face a more difficult set 
of commercial policy choices. Since conditions for Pareto optimality are not met, these are 
inevitably second-best situations, to be chosen in the presence of shifting constraints. Further, 
implementation of optimum intervention rules is prevented by incomplete organizational 
frameworks. The dynamic implications of trade constitute the most basic guideline for policy 
makers, however. The paper reviews the dynamic gains from trade, particularly pivotal in the case 
of the small Central American countries. The consequences of being small are further explored, 
to justify the inevitability of openness. Given small managerial teams, these countries mu.s.t 
economize in their strategic behavior. Five strategic options analyzed are: (a) unilateral movement 
toward free trade; (b) a Central American free trade area; (c) consolidation of the CACM as a step 
towards accession to large markets; (d) bilateral trade agreements; (e) preferential access to US 
market. The choices imply resource allocation, adjustment, political and transaction costs. The 
paper provides criteria to minimize these costs. 
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Strategic Options of Commercial Policy for Central America: 
Basic Guidelines1 
by 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Introduction: Celebrating NAFT A 
In Central America, the political debate in Mexico, Canada, and particularly the United 
States, preceding the agreement on a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), was followed 
with considerable interest and, on the night of November 17, 1993, when the agreement was fi-
nally ratified by the U.S. Congress, there was an almost generalized sense of celebration. Such 
enthusiasm, which from the perspective of some concerned observers was almost ironic, would 
require an explanation beyond the scope of this paper. 
Part of the justification for the implicit optimism may have been, nevertheless, the fact that 
ratification of the NAFTA agreement was interpreted (with more or less caution) as a signal of 
the defeat of protectionist forces in the United States. This interpretation was partly due, in turn, 
to the obvious subordination, during the debate in that country, of concerns for the international 
consequences of the agreement to domestic political (electoral) considerations. This was (cor-
rectly) perceived as part of a growing trend towards more inward-looking, isolationist attitudes 
in the United States. The success of such views would have meant less opportunities for trade, 
discouragement of private capital flows, and reductions in public foreign assistance. 
Moreover, not only would most of the arguments concerning the potential economic im-
pacts of the creation of the free trade area, advanced during the passionate debate, not resist the 
simple scrutiny of basic economic theory, but much of the discussion was colored by explicitly 
xenophobic postures. Particularly disturbing to the Central American countries were numerous 
claims (widely held during the electoral campaign) of U.S. job losses as a consequence of several 
preferential programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), of immediate interest to the 
region. 
1 Paper prepared for the Washington Office of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
2 The author is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at The Ohio State 
University. He is grateful to Isaac Cohen and Daniel Lederman, of ECLAC, for their encourage-
ment and insistence that he write this paper. 
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Clearly, the implications of N AFT A for the welfare of the Central American countries die 
substantial (although not yet completely understood), but such considerations did not play any role 
in the arguments of those who opposed ratification of the agreement. Instead, the success of such 
vocal forces (e.g., Ross Perot) would have appeared as particularly threatening to Central America 
and their defeat was thus a legitimate cause for celebration. 
Protectionism in the United States has always been seen as an obstacle to increased eco-
nomic welfare in Central America, even by those who would still support protection for the re-
gion's domestic activities. What represents a comparatively new attitude, however, is growing 
support of freer international trade, even if it means less protection to the national industries. To 
the extent to which the formation of NAFTA was perceived (correctly or incorrectly) as a move-
ment towards freer world trade, this celebration also reflected new attitudes towards commercial 
policies in the region. Such views have been behind the promotion of the more outward-looking 
strategies of development adopted after the crisis of the early 1980s, while at the same time they 
have been further fueled by the success of the new policies. 
From this perspective, ratification of the NAFTA agreement was implicitly recognized as 
a first step in an ideally rapid process of trade liberalization in the Western hemisphere. Indeed, 
NAFTA was viewed as just one more element in the implementation of the ideas advanced in 1990 
by President Bush's Initiative for the Americas, calling for freer trade. Many thereby op-
timistically hoped that similar decisions would soon benefit other countries and, in particular, 
Central America. The expectation of the rapid progress of this sequence might have actually ob-
scured understanding of the immediate costs to the region from the formation of NAFTA. 
Indeed, the creation of free trade areas such as NAFTA has positive and negative effects 
on non-member countries (e.g., Central America), which broadly include: trade diversion, terms-
of-trade changes, investment diversion, and the positive externalities associated with the "growth 
dividend." Trade diversion due to NAFTA will most likely imply reductions in Central American 
exports to Canada and the United States, as Mexican producers gain preferential access to those 
markets. Even more threatening, however, would be incentives to foreign capital to locate in 
Mexico rather than Central America. 
On the other hand, the dynamic benefits of trade liberalization (from capital formation, 
industry specialization, and the ability to import specialized inputs, for example) may increase 
output growth rates in the member countries (Young and Romero, 1991; Kehoe, 1992). Such in-
crease in growth rates was expected particularly for Mexico (Hutbauer and Schott, 1992), with 
the corresponding increase in demands for imports from Central America. Thus, the direction and 
magnitude of the net impacts from NAFTA on Central America were not well known and, given 
their uncertain nature, celebration was not unambiguously called for. The reactions may have been 
dominated, therefore, by the presumed victory of the U.S. anti-protectionist forces. 
If this was the case, a key question, not explored in detail in this paper, would be the ex-
tent to which protectionism was really defeated by the ratification of NAFTA. There is no doubt 
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that the approval was a blow to Ross Perot and other demagogic politicians who attempted to use 
the debate for electoral gain, whose voices were at least temporarily discredited. From a political 
economy perspective, however, the key protectionist threat comes mostly from powerful vested 
interests (firms and workers) potentially hurt by a reduction of U.S. protectionism. 
Such vested interests were evidently present during the negotiations of the agreement c:~rul 
might have been able to shape many elements (rules, time tables, lists of exceptions) of the fmal 
accord. This is not surprising. Commercial policy in the United States, as elsewhere, has been 
significantly influenced by lobbies that utilize the political arena to gain and defend protection for 
their activities from foreign competition (Baldwin 1984, 1985). These vested interests were al-
ready present in earlier decisions about preferential agreements favorable to Central America, 
such as the CBI. They represent the interests most threatened by free trade from the region, cor-
responding to activities in which the Central American countries possess comparative advantages. 
Contrary to the expressed intent of these programs, the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) and the CBI systematically biased United States imports from the area away from manufac-
tured consumer goods, agricultural products, and textiles, apparel, and leather goods (Ray, 1987). 
This was particularly the case of imports into the United States facing declining, low productivity 
industries. Ray (1981) found that effective protection in the United States was higher for industries 
using low-skill, labor intensive methods of production, while Marvel and Ray (1983 also found 
that protection was higher for industries experiencing slow growth. 
These historical patterns of protection in the United States have been sustained after the 
granting of preferences (such as the CBI) through the adoption of non-tariff barriers (NTB) to 
trade (Ray, 1989). Additional research would be needed in order to determine if the strengfr~ of 
these protectionist lobbies has actually been weakened by the NAFTA agreement. To the extent 
to which they contribute to continued high rates of protection despite NAFTA, which may not 
apply to Mexico, they increase opportunities for trade diversion away from Central America. 
Celebration of the ratification of the NAFT A agreement was thus seen by many as the first 
act of a longer, hemispheric, trade liberalization play. Moreover, freer trade was viewed as the 
natural sequel to both the strict conditionality that had characterized substantial amounts of foreign 
assistance during the 1980s and the accompanying transformation of the Central American 
economies during the second-half of the decade. If indeed this was a signal for freer trade to come 
(and for aid levels to decline), it did have tremendous importance. 
A second, critical question would thus be the expected speed and depth of implementation 
of this hemispheric process of trade liberalization. The answer to this question is not evident. The 
NAFTA debate extracted a high political cost from the Clinton administration, which became 
understandably reluctant to lose additional political capital in pursuing new trade agreements. This 
was reflected for some time in no more than subtle and diffused promises to lower hemispheric 
trade barriers. Although the Miami Presidential Summit's commitment to a Free Trade Area for 
the Americas by the year 2005 introduced an explicit agenda leading to this outcome, those 
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celebrating the ratification of NAFTA in November, 1993 may have had a more rapid accession 
process in mind. Moreover, unexpected political changes in the United States may delay (or 
accelerate) such an outcome. 
From the perspective of this paper, a most important cost from the ratification of the 
NAFTA agreement has been that the Central American countries today face a considerably more 
difficult set of policy choices than before. With the creation of NAFTA, not only is identification 
and quantification of the potential impacts of the agreement quite a difficult task for the limited 
technocratic resources of the region, but its adoption further complicated the strategic commerrial 
policy choices that these countries face. Understanding the basic nature of these complications is 
the purpose of this paper. 
II. Second-Best Solutions and Strategic Choices 
The commercial policy choices faced by the Central American countries today are more 
difficult than ever for the following reasons. 
First, in principle, since all the conditions for (constrained) Pareto optimality are actually 
not being met, such policy exercises are inevitably second-best games. Conceptually, the resul'mg 
suboptimality implies several consequences: 
(a) Although still powerful as a tool for policymakers, the authorities can expect more limited 
guidance from economic theory in these cases than they can from predictions about first-
best outcomes. In these circumstances theory still matters, but it is not enough. 
(b) The correct (sub-optimum) policy choices will also depend on the nature of the (empirical) 
initial conditions, including the opportunities and constraints introduced by NAFTA. 
(c) Although theory can serve as a guide for the identification of the initial conditions tl:::t 
matter, relative magnitudes (of the relevant elasticities, propensities, and other parameters) 
need to be measured in each case and their expected changes forecasted. In many 
instances, measurement and/or forecasting problems may be unsurmountable. 
(d) Resource reallocation impacts resulting from policies and shocks, even when estimated 
with the most sophisticated of available instruments (such as advanced computable general 
equilibrium models), depend on critical assumptions and on the correct approximation of 
the actual elasticities. 
(e) Such elasticities are not independent, moreover, of the particular policy choices made (Lal, 
1987; Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). Willingness to invest in a new activity, willingness to inno-
vate, willingness to take a particular risk (which, in tum, determine the magnitude of 
relevant elasticities) differ according to the policy scenario chosen. That is, such elas-
ticities are endogenously determined, jointly with the choice of development strategy and 
associated policies. Questions must be asked about how particular policy choices are ex-
pected to influence the magnitude of those elasticities and other parameters. 
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(f) To the extent to which answers about the most appropriate policy choices will be of the 
type "it depends," they may not necessarily be the same for all of the countries. To the 
extent to which the initial conditions in the Central American countries are sufficiently 
similar, however, one would expect suboptimal policies not to be different among them. 
Second, another reason for the complexity is that these inevitably second-best decisions 
must be made in the presence of domestic and international constraints that are not given (con-
stant), but that are volatile, uncertain, and difficult to predict. Events such as the ratification of 
N AFT A modify the countries' initial conditions and increase uncertainty, in this case about the 
rules of the game for continued and enhanced access to the region's most important market: the 
United States. Thus, in the presence of shifting constraints, suboptimal choices must be subject 
to frequent revisions. All of this adds to the costs of arriving at the correct policy choices. 
Recognition by the authorities of the implications of departures from first-best situations 
is undoubtedly important for them to better understand the actual nature of the policy options 
faced. In some important cases, such recognition should actually shape specific choices. This 
would be particularly true in decisions about joining customs unions and free trade areas, when 
there are credible fears of substantial trade diversion. Recognition of such second-best results 
should have accompanied a more cautious reaction to the ratification of NAFT A, as well. 
In general, however, practical application of optimum intervention rules in second-best cir-
cumstances is not easy and may become actually non-operational. First, the correct policy choices 
require the identification of the precise nature of the deviations from the conditions for Pareto 
optimality, as well as measurement of their extent (Bhagwati, 1968). 
Second, governments must possess the administrative mechanisms required to implement 
policies in a non-distorting manner. Establishing a technocratic machinery and the institutions 
necessary to carry out the desired second-best policies is not a simple task (Krueger, 1994). All 
types of technical problems of administration must be resolved, while incentives and mechanisms 
are weak or lacking to induce public entities to achieve efficiency and low-cost outcomes. Private 
agents have incentives as well to falsify or conceal information, creating problems of incentive 
incompatibility. In this context, assumptions about the capacity of governments to intervene 
correctly become as heroic as assumptions about the complete absence of market imperfections. 
Fortunately, the most important arguments about the desirability of freer trade are not ne-
cessarily based on the (comparative) static resource reallocation effects that constitute the rer.lm 
of first -best neoclassical economics or second-best optimum intervention theory. Rather, they re-
flect the significant dynamic implications associated with an increased openness of the economy, 
recognized by Adam Smith and other classical economists. These dynamic implications should 
constitute the first general guideline for policymakers. 
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III. The General Case for Free Trade 
According to the static case for free trade, the removal of barriers to foreign transactions 
expands a country's set of feasible consumption possibilities. It does so by providing an oppor-
tunity to transform domestic resources into goods and services so valuable to the rest of the world 
(e.g., coffee) that the country's purchasing power expands. This allows a higher level of income 
per capita, but from this static perspective it does not guarantee a permanently faster rate of 
growth of the economy (Lucas, 1985). 
That countries with more open economies have generally shown a better growth record is 
only a confirmation of the importance of trade's dynamic effects (Lal and Rajapatirana). Trade 
is important particularly because it promotes an economic environment that encourages en-
trepreneurship, innovation and creativity, the acquisition and use of knowledge in increasing pro-
ductivity, risk taking and thrift, and the ambition that leads to work harder and the pursuit of other 
economic goals. These are the non-quantifiable determinants of growth that critically influence 
the residual not captured by the traditional factor of production accumulations. If this is the case, 
one can explain the stylized fact of a statistically significant positive relationship between income 
growth rates and the importance of exports in gross domestic product. Openness introduces new 
sources of economic discipline for both private and public sector entrepreneurs (Gonzalez Vega., 
1992). In facing increased competition, private sector firms can no longer be complacent about 
costs, product quality, and market services. They can no longer waste substantial resources in 
lobbying and other directly unproductive activities aimed at defending effective protection of 
production for a captive domestic market (Monge Gonzalez and Gonzalez Vega, 1995). All 
entrepreneurial energy must be devoted instead to create competitive advantages in appropriate 
market niches and to generate process, product, and service innovations that sustain a competitive 
edge (Beristain and Sanchez). This reallocation of valuable resources from directly unproductive 
activities to areas of comparative advantage has a powerful impact on income levels. 
Openness discourages governments, in turn, from creating policy-induced distortions in 
the workings of the price mechanism. As Krueger (1978) argued, "a growth strategy oriented to-
ward exports entails the development of policies that make markets and incentives function better, 
while an import-substitution strategy usually involves policies designed to frustrate individuals' 
maximizing behavior under market incentives" (p. 284). 
Openness forces the authorities to protect macroeconomic stability, if the competitiveness 
of domestic firms in international markets is going to be preserved. Fiscal and monetary instability 
and healthy export growth are not compatible. For the same reason, real interest rates and real 
exchange rates cannot diverge much from their equilibrium levels. Inflation, which destroys op-
portunities for economic calculation, cannot be allowed. Similarly, domestic price regulations that 
hamper comparisons of relative profitability have to be dismantled. 
Competitiveness also requires the authorities to provide the physical and institutional infra-
structure required for exports. Ports and airports, roads, telecommunications, refrigerated storage 
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and customs facilities must be upgraded. Legal systems need to be modernized and instruments 
for conflict resolution in international transactions provided. Without the critical provision of these 
public goods, the export drive encouraged by trade liberalization will not be as successful in 
increasing real per capita incomes. With increased openness, therefore, public sector actions will 
more likely focus on good domestic policies and the development of a productivity-enhancing 
infrastructure. 
All of these are compelling (dynamic) reasons to seek freer trade, even when all the do-
mestic conditions for Pareto optimality (in an static framework) are not present. They are par-
ticularly tenable in the case of small economies, such as those in Central America. They should 
constitute the most basic general guidelines about trade liberalization for Central American policy-
makers. 
IV. Small Is Not Always Beautiful 
In order to establish objectives for commercial policy decisions and evaluate alternative 
trade options for the Central American countries, it is also critical to understand the implications 
of being small. The Central American countries are too small, from several perspectives: 
(a) The Central American economies are small countries in the traditional sense of interna-
tional trade theory; because they possess (individually or collectively) no market (mono-
poly or monopsony) power, they are price takers in world markets. 
That is, by modifying their levels of desired imports or exports, these countries will not 
be able to improve their international terms-of-trade, which they must take as given. In some ways 
this may be a blessing. On the one hand, they need not worry about overproduction of exportables 
reducing their prices or underproduction of importables increasing them. On the other hand, they 
can concentrate their efforts in generating competitive advantages in particular market niches and 
in expanding their market shares, without worrying about price effects. 
The immediate theoretical implication of being small price-taking countries is that, for 
them, the optimum tariff is a zero tariff. Equally true is that the optimum export tax, the optimum 
export subsidy, and the optimum import subsidy are all zero as well. It is important to keep this 
in mind when evaluating "protectionist" initiatives to promote exports, as have been the granting 
of certificates (certificados de abono tributario) as export incentives. 
(b) The Central American countries possess (individually and collectively) domestic markets 
that are so small that this prevents them from securing the maximum productivity from 
available resources. 
From a technological perspective, the domestic markets of the Central American countries 
are too small to allow for significant economies of scale or economies of scope in any production 
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directed exclusively to those markets. By widening the potential market, international trade allows 
these countries to adopt modern technologies, exploit the economies of scale and of scope 
associated with them, and reduce costs of production to competitive levels. 
From an organizational perspective, the domestic markets of the Central American coun-
tries allow for only limited specialization, division of labor, and competition. The competitive 
pressures exerted by imports, as trade is liberalized, prevent the emergence of welfare-reducing 
domestic monopolies, while access to the world market allows specialization that significantly 
reduces costs of production. These are powerful mechanisms to increase the productivity of re-
sources in any economy. 
(c) Domestic markets are not only small, but in some of the Central American countries they 
are particularly fragmented. 
In several of these economies, opportunities for arbitrage in markets for goods and factors 
of production are reduced by ethnic barriers and by the limited development of the physical and 
institutional infrastructure, leaving many opportunities for improved resource allocation unex-
ploited. Such fragmentation accentuates the shortcomings of a small domestic market and calls for 
domestic market integration as a key challenge for policymakers. This objective demands an active 
presence of an effective state in providing the required public goods, a task that for a long time 
was neglected in Central America, for the sake of adopting interventionist policies to modify price 
and quantity formation, away from supply and demand, in many markets. Reform of the state in 
these countries should at the same time reduce the size of the public sector and strengthen the 
ability of governments to undertake these hard tasks (Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). 
(d) The Central American economies are too small to allow for the efficient production of 
some non-tradable goods that are critical inputs in the production of tradables, thus in-
creasing the costs of production of the latter. In general, if transaction costs in the do-
mestic economy are too high, competitiveness will be reduced. 
This problem is particularly acute when economies of scale are substantial, such as in the 
development of the physical infrastructure which, in tum, is so important for the reduction of 
transaction costs. This may be one of the strongest arguments for a process of integration of the 
Central American economies that focused on the development of a common physical and institu-
tional infrastructure. 
(e) Narrow vectors of factor endowments leave these geographically small economies vul-
nerable to systemic shocks (e.g., natural catastrophes) and with limited opportunities for 
diversification. 
Openness of the capital account, that allows for asset portfolio diversification, is indispens-
able to enable Central Americans more efficient risk management opportunities. Thus, the authori-
ties must address liberalization of both the current and the capital account of the balance of 
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payments as well as the macroeconomic complications that accompany international capital flows. 
When this is the case, additional constraints on fiscal and monetary policy are need to protect 
macroeconomic stability. This is not an easy task. 
(f) The Central American countries possess small entrepreneurial teams to manage both pri-
vate sector firms and public sector organizations. 
The numbers of those with the training, skills, and experience to manage internationally 
competitive firms and/or design and implement a wide array of new policies, negotiate free trade 
agreements, and provide leadership to a new set of organizations are small. If such entrepreneurial 
abilities are the scarcest resource in these economies, special efforts must be spent to avoid any 
waste in their allocation. This feature (small teams) introduces critical constraints for the strategic 
choices available to the authorities. 
In conclusion, given the shortcomings of such small economies and the expected dynamic 
contributions of trade to economic growth (which seem to dominate the static gains and losses 
under first and second-best scenarios), the only reasonable option for the Central American econ-
omies appears to be acceptance of the inevitability of a high degree of openness and integrati.un 
into the world economy. 
In the same way that small countries have to take world prices as given, the Central Amer-
ican economies must take something very close to free trade as given and, rather than resist this 
outcome, focus their energies on how to increase the competitiveness and flexibility of their 
economies, in order to obtain the best results from this unavoidable circumstance. It is from this 
perspective that they must evaluate their strategic policy options. 
V. Human Resource Allocation to Policymaking 
Powerful basic generalizations about the dynamic effects of trade on growth and welfare 
constitute the foundations for contemporary views on trade and development and suggest the di-
rection of policy reform for the Central American countries. These concepts must be ceaselessly 
remembered during processes of policy design, implementation, and revision, in order not to al-
low inappropriate second-best(ism) to divert the efforts of the authorities away from these prin-
ciples. 
At the same time, however, such generalizations are not enough to guide the actions of 
policymakers, who must solve strategic questions about when, how, and at what speed to move 
from here to there. These strategic issues pose difficult questions to the authorities, for which 
economic theory offers at best much less clear answers. Resolving them would require the skills 
and efforts of some of the countries' best minds. 
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If, furthermore, the managerial teams available to design and implement commercial pol-
icies in the Central American countries are too small, decisions about how to allocate their efforts 
are critically important. These decisions are not easy, in any case, given increasing complexities 
of world trade arrangements and the uncertainties about future rules of the game. Events such as 
adoption of the NAFT A agreement, for example, further complicate the difficulties of designing 
appropriate commercial policy strategies for Central America. The efforts of the existing 
technocratic teams could be easily wasted if they had to design and implement a large number of 
policy options at the same time. 
At the most basic level, the authorities have to choose how to spend time and effort in ad-
dressing two alternative ways to promote the beneficial dynamic effects from trade: 
(a) Efforts must be spent in revising commercial policies, in order to "get the prices right," 
so that economic agents face the appropriate incentives in choosing markets for their pro-
duction and consumption activities. 
In the presence of incorrect signals, the well-intentioned (private profit/utility maximizing) 
actions of economic agents will not lead to socially optimum resource allocations. To induce the 
appropriate signals, the Central American countries must design and implement policies that allow 
them to maximize the welfare gains from their insertion in the world economy. Trade policy 
reforms take trrne and effort. 
(b) Attention must be paid to improving an environment that allows economic agents, guided 
by correct price signals, to respond effectively by reallocating resources and by investing 
to take advantage of the new productive opportunities. 
Efforts must be spent in accomplishing four complementary tasks for this purpose: 
(i) improving the institutional and regulatory framework that allows markets to func-
tion smoothly (legal systems that defme property rights and provide mechanisms 
for contract design, courts for contract enforcement, grades and standards for 
trade, prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions and the like); 
(ii) upgrading the physical infrastructure, in order to reduce transaction costs and fa-
cilitate international operations; 
(iii) further integrating the domestic market, in order not to create artificial distinctions 
between tradable and non-tradable goods and service; and 
(iv) maintaining macroeconomic stability. 
All of these interventions would enhance competitiveness and would increase the elasticity 
of the supply of tradable goods in the economy. These tasks, however, are even harder to ac-
complish than revisions of commercial policy (despite the usual political economy complications) 
and do require a supply of managers and skilled personnel to solve the technical and administra-
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tive questions that emerge. In general, they require an ability of the state apparatus to accomplish 
tasks in a timely and cost -effective manner. 
VI. Five Strategic Options 
In their attempts to modify the nature and extent of their insertion in the international 
economy, the Central American countries face a number of strategic options that they may pursue 
either as a single or as a set of complementary approaches. These options include, at least, the 
following: 
(a) A unilateral movement towards freer trade, through the additional removal by each coun-
try of existing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade with the rest of the world. 
(b) A concerted movement towards freer trade within the Central American region, in order 
to improve the operation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) as a free 
trade area, in recognition of the implications of geographical proximity and the histor:cal 
roots of the integration process (i.e., some form of open sub-regionalism). This may be 
complemented with policy actions to reduce the transaction costs of trade throughout the 
region, in order to integrate it as a single market. 
(c) Consolidation of the CACM as a subregional entity, not per se but as a required step to-
ward negotiations of accession to larger markets. These may include free traoe agreements 
with Mexico, the United States, NAFTA, and/or other existing or future trade ar-
rangements in the hemisphere (Group of Three, Andean Group). 
(d) Efforts to independently pursue bilateral free trade agreements with specific countries 
(e.g., Costa Rica with Mexico). 
(e) Actions to demand, individually or collectively, the continuation of preferential access to 
the United States market, through mechanisms such as an enhanced CBI, and battles for 
improved access to other major markets (e.g., bananas and the European Union). 
VII. Costs and Benefits of a Strategy Choice 
Given the number of strategic options faced by the Central American countries and the 
limited time and resources available to their small trade-policy management teams, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for them to pursue all of these possible alternatives and/or to move 
along a number of parallel avenues. Potential contradictions may even render such a broad-based 
approach inappropriate. The key strategic question then becomes how to choose among alternative 
policy options. 
This is a typical exercise in strategic planning. At the simplest level, it requires a clear 
identification of the objectives (goals pursued) and a determination of the expected costs and ben-
efits of each option. Given the complexity of the options (including all of the measurement and 
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forecasting issues raised above), even this is not an easy task. Once such costs and benefits are 
identified, decisions must be made, constrained by the scarce managerial resources available. 
At the more general level, the costs (and benefits) of each strategic option include at least 
the following: 
(a) Resource allocation costs: 
These represent all (long-term) impacts of each alternative policy option on the efficiency 
of resource allocation (aggregate welfare) in the economy, including: 
(i) the traditional static costs and gains from shifts in policy regimes (Harberger 
triangles); 
(ii) the dynamic consequences of different degrees of openness; and 
(iii) those costs associated with directly unproductive profit seeking activities (DUP) 
and other wasteful uses of resources induced by the policy regime chosen. 
(iv) environmental costs. 
Measurement of these costs and benefits can become quite difficult if various policy re-
gimes coexist and keeping track- of them would be almost impossible if different policy 
regimes are adopted sequentiall) , modifying relevant elasticities in the process. 
(b) Adjustment costs: 
These represent all (short-term) costs of adjustment of production structures and consump-
tion patterns to changing market signals, including: 
(i) the costs of shifts in investment patterns (as the relative profitability of investment 
opportunities is modified by the policy regimes), including the costs of irreversible 
investments and sudden obsolescence; 
(ii) the costs of shifts in employment opportunities, with all the economic and human 
losses from (even temporary) unemployment and labor force reallocations; and 
(iii) the additional (fiscal) costs of multiple compensations (if any) to sectors negatively 
affected by the policy shifts. 
(c) Political costs: 
Commercial policy shifts typically induce redistributions of purchasing power among sec-
tors of the population that are significantly larger than resource reallocation effects on 
aggregate welfare (Rodrik, 1992). While the traditional static changes in welfare from 
trade policy revisions are typically estimated to represent one or two percent of the GDP, 
the accompanying redistributions of income may represent 10 to 20 percent of the GDP 
(Monge Gonzalez and Gonzalez Vega, 1995). The political costs of such redistributions 
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are very high. Such costs would multiply with the sequential pursuit of several of the 
policy options listed above. 
(d) Transaction costs: 
Policy revisions represent additional transaction costs both for the public sector teams 
managing commercial policies and the private sector firms that have to adjust to the new 
rules of the game. Because of the comparative scarcity of entrepreneurial talent, there is 
every reason to economize and avoid unnecessarily duplicate uses of these valuable re-
sources. 
VIII. Basic Strategic Guidelines 
Given the potentially high costs of frequent policy shifts and/or the simultaneous pursuit 
of numerous commercial policy options, the authorities need some basic guidelines to direct their 
choices. This paper proposes five basic criteria in dealing with these decisions: 
(a) Criterion I: Attempt to secure access to as large a market as possible. 
The key to the static and dynamic gains from trade is the impact of market size on mech-
anisms to increase the productivity of available resources. The larger the market, the more 
powerful the beneficial influence of these processes. 
(b) Criterion II: Move toward solutions that rely, as much as possible, on the country's long-
term comparative advantages. 
The goal is to maximize the purchasing power of the country's population (a proxy for 
maximum welfare), by allocating resources to the production of commodities and services 
that are highly valued in world markets. Intermediate solutions that negate comparative 
advantages impose high social costs. 
(c) Criterion III: Move as close to the fmal policy configuration as possible. 
Each intermediate step is costly (from the perspective of adjustment, political, and tran-
saction costs). Unnecessary steps must be avoided. 
(d) Criterion IV: Move as rapidly as possible. 
Although some gradualism may appear to reduce (concave) adjustment costs as well as 
political costs, this is not frequently the case (Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). The longer it takes 
to arrive at the final solution, on the other hand, the higher the resource allocation and 
transaction costs involved. 
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(e) Criterion V: Play with the strong. 
Learning processes are more fruitful and preparedness is better achieved when undertaken 
with strong partners that share the same long-term vision rather than with weak partnc::.-s 
that are reluctant to move ahead rapidly. 
The strategic options faced by the Central American countries are evaluated in this paper 
in terms of their expected costs and benefits and in light of the guidelines discussed above. 
IX. Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
Two parallel processes have dominated world trade policies in the last decade. One has 
been the movement towards reductions in global protectionism associated with the successful mul-
tilateral negotiation of the Uruguay Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The other one has been the 
resurgence of preferential regional trade treaties, which represent a departure of the most favored 
nation principle, and may thus reduce world trade (Rajapatirana, 1994). 
Independently of the volume of net trade created either by multilateral trade liberalization 
or free trade agreements, the world market continues to be the mo~t attractive option for the Cen-
tral American economies (criterion I). Increased openness toward the world market must repre-
sent, therefore, their most basic commercial policy goal. The strategic question is how to best aiJ-
proach the desired greater insertion of the Central American economies into world trade flows. 
This paper claims that the most effective way of achieving this objective is through unilateral trade 
liberalization. Moreover, unilateral trade liberalization facilitates (reduces the costs of) more 
limited trade agreements with other countries and is thus compatible with some of the other policy 
options faced by the Central American countries. 
Further expansion of the Central American countries' international trade is constrained 
both by protectionism at home and abroad as well as by deficiencies in the countries' physical and 
institutional infrastructure. In particular, the protectionist strategy of import-substitution industri-
alization introduced well-known biases against exports and inefficiencies in resource allocation 
(violated criterion II). As a result, the Central American economies generated less purchasing 
power, at international prices, than would have been possible in the absence of such distortions. 
Domestic protectionism reduced economic welfare. Protectionism abroad (particularly in the 
United States and the European Union) reduced economic welfare in Central America as well. 
The welfare of the Central American populations could be increased, therefore, through 
further reduction of protectionism both at home and abroad. These two processes need not be 
conditioned on each other, however. The welfare losses from domestic protectionism can be 
eliminated by unilateral trade liberalization. The welfare losses from foreign protectionism can 
be eliminated by the unilateral actions of the United States and the European Union (maybe as a 
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result of political persuasion). Protectionism both at home and abroad may be (but will not 
inevitably be) reduced as a consequence of the negotiation of trade agreements. 
With unilateral trade liberalization, the expected welfare improvement is certain, resulting 
from a better allocation of available resources. Such an improvement is also certain if foreign 
countries unilaterally undertake a reduction of their barriers to imports from the Central American 
countries (equivalent to an improvement in their international terms of trade). Because they may 
lead both to trade creation and trade diversion effects, trade agreements may not improve welfare, 
however (second-best principle). 
The net effect of free trade agreements may still be beneficial if the accords provide access 
to a much larger market (e.g., the United States), which is already the source of low-cost imports 
for the country (small trade diversion effects). Such free trade agreements may also be desirable 
in second-best political economy scenarios in which opposition to unilateral liberalization is 
unsurmountable, but this is not the case because of the quid pro quo of the agreement. 
A most important reason for the priority given here to immediate unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion is that the greatest expected welfare gains for the Central American countries are associated 
with the elimination of the anti-export bias of domestic protectionism. The implicit tax levied on 
exports by the protectionist import-substitution structure has been high in Central America, 
leading to important welfare losses. 
Utilizing a general equilibrium framework, in the case of Costa Rica, Monge Gonzalez and 
Gonzalez Vega (1994) found that, in 1989, the implicit tax (net of the impact of export subsidies 
--CATs) meant that 66 percent of the level of the average tariff used to protect import substitution 
activities was transferred as a levy on exports. That year, protection increased the domestic price 
of imported commodities by 55 percent above their international price, but it increased the price 
of imported goods with respect to non-tradable goods by only 13 percent, while the price of 
exports declined by 25 percent with respect to non-tradables. That is, because of such protection, 
with the same (physical) amount of sales abroad, exporters received 25 percent less in terms of 
non-tradable goods than if such protection would not have existed. It was necessary to tax expnrts 
by 25 percent in order to offer 13 percent of true protection against imports. The implicit tax was 
32 percent in the case of traditional exports (coffee, bananas, sugar, and beef) and 15 percent in 
the case of non-traditional exports (22 percent without the CATs). 
Given their estimated elasticity of export supply for Costa Rica of 0. 73, Monge Gonzalez 
and Gonzalez Vega (1994) found that domestic protection reduced this country's annual exports 
by 18.3 percent. This meant that the anti-export bias of protectionism had reduced Costa Rica's 
exports by U.S.$ 304 million in 1989. On the other hand, these authors estimated that elimination 
of all tariff barriers to United States imports of textiles, apparel, and leather goods from Costa 
Rica (20 percent of Costa Rica's exports to the United States) would have resulted in U.S.$ 11.8 
million of additional export earnings. While elimination of such protectionist measures against 
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Costa Rican exports in the United States would be beneficial to this country, it appears that the 
gains from unilateral trade liberalization would be more substantial. 
Moreover, domestic protectionism reduces welfare not only because of the induced misal-
location of resources but also because of wasteful directly unproductive (DUP) activities, such as 
the use of resources in lobbying and other efforts to acquire and maintain protection (Bhagwati, 
1982). The welfare losses associated with DUP activities are typically much larger than those 
represented by the traditional Harberger triangles. Monge Gonzalez and Gonzalez Vega (1995) 
found traditional estimates of the welfare losses from Costa Rican protectionism in 1989 to be 
equivalent to 0.9 percent of the GDP, commensurate with similar measurements in other coun-
tries. On the other hand, they estimated the upper bound to the welfare losses due to DUP 
activities at 20.3 percent of GDP. If unilateral trade liberalization reduced the extent of DFP 
activities, its impact on welfare could be very large. 
In recent years, the Central American countries have drastically reduced tariff and non-
tariff barriers to imports from the rest of the world (Lizano, 1994). From levels around 80 percent 
for the CACM common external tariff on imports of final goods a few years ago, by 1993 the 
tariff ceiling had been lowered to 20 percent, while tariffs on inputs and intermediate and capital 
goods reached 5 percent (with many imports benefiting from duty free status). Recent initiatives 
will move tariff levels to the 15-1 percent range. This process of unilateral trade liberalization has 
already born its fruits. The implicit levels of effective protection continue to be high .nd 
dispersed, however, and additional gains could be obtained from additional tariff reductions. 
Unilateral trade liberalization has been accompanied by accession to the GATT (by Costa 
Rica in 1989 and the other countries after 1991). While the Central American countries can play 
a small role in promoting multilateralism in this forum and in the new World Trade Organization, 
their potential impact there is very limited (being such small countries, they are essentially free 
riders in worldwide process of liberalization). The most important impact of such participation 
is the discipline (principally through the most favored nation principle) that results from 
membership, which bolsters unilateral liberalization (Alam and Rajapatirana, 1993). 
In a second-best scenario, a most important role of continued unilateral trade liberalization 
in Central America is a reduction in the threat from trade diversion that may accompany participa-
tion in several bilateral free trade agreements as well as in the CACM. The lower the effective 
rate of protection of domestic production, the less the probability that trade will be diverted away 
from cheap sources of supply toward less cost-effective partners in the free trade area or customs 
union (criterion II). 
X. A Central American Free Trade Area Plus 
The welfare-improving impact of a Central American country's unilateral trade liberaliza-
tion can be complemented with the additional welfare gains from the reduction of barriers to im-
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ports by its trade partners' (e.g. , other Central American countries, the United States) and the as-
sociated expansion of its exports. When such liberalization is not unilaterally undertaken by its 
trade partners, it can be achieved through a free trade area (FTA) agreement, which can serve as 
an strategic instrument to induce the reduction of barriers to trade by other countries. 
The distinction in the removal of barriers to trade between FT A members and the rest of 
the world creates a second-best scenario, however, introducing the potential for welfare-reducing 
trade diversion effects (Viner, 1950). Preferential FTAs are departures from the most favored 
nation principle (first best), in that they bestow access to each member's market that is not auto-
matically granted to all other countries. Trade is diverted from outside to inside the region and 
welfare is reduced. Some claim, however, that it is "nearly impossible to determine definitely and 
precisely whether trade creation or trade diversion predominates as a result of the establishment 
of any particular regional trade agreement" (Steinberg, 1993, p. 322). 
While participation in any FT A is a decision not to be taken lightly, efforts to strengthen 
the CACM as a well-functioning free trade area seem to be a natural policy choice for the Central 
American countries. Since there are always prospects for trade diversion in forming regional frc~ 
trade areas and the benefits and costs of joining cannot be clearly and easily established a priori, 
an important dimension of any strategic choice for the Central American countries in this 
connection would be to consider mechanisms to minimize the risks from participation in the new 
C. _.:M (Rajapatirana, 1994). 
The most important line of defense against welfare-reducing trade diversion effects is to 
insist on low protection against imports from the rest of the world in the first place. This will 
reduce the potential for trade diversion, because the profitability of substituting for imports from 
low-cost sources outside the CACM would be low (criterion II). This guideline highlights the 
importance of (individual or collective) unilateral trade liberalization. Institutional regional mech-
anisms must be created that continue the push toward the unilateral reduction of barriers to trade 
with the rest of the world, such that participation in the CACM becomes an instrument (building 
block) for further liberalization and not an obstacle (stumbling block) for it. 
Moreover, while member countries should have the lowest possible tariffs for imports from 
the rest of the world (with tariffs being the only form of protection), attempts must also be made 
to increase competition within the region, for instance by removing existing domestic regulations 
that might limit such competition. In particular, harmonization of tax rules and of corporate 
regulations would permit keener competition across frontiers and in non-tradable sectors. 
In general, the development of an institutional infrastructure that allows for lower transac-
tion costs would permit further integration of each country's domestic market as well as of the 
regional market, lessening the negative impact of fragmentation on productivity. The transaction 
costs incurred in regional trade and factor movements can be further reduced, as well, by the 
development of the physical infrastructure. Regional projects that generate economies of scale and 
of scope in areas such as transportation, (electric) energy, telecommunications and the like are 
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natural candidates for specific initiatives for cooperation. Joint research, technological transfer, 
and training programs as well as development of financial systems are also promising. 
Macroeconomic policy coordination becomes important, furthermore, if competitive forces 
are to be mobilized to induce a better allocation of resources within the regional market. At the 
same time, although a common external tariff is desirable, because it vitiates the need to hwe 
rules of origin and the need for a (discretionary) bureaucracy to administer them, its adoption 
would be justified only within an institutionalized mechanism for continued unilateral trade liberal-
ization. There does not seem to exist, for this process, an inexorable pattern that would replicate 
the path followed by the European Union (Rajapatirana, 1994). 
To participate in the CACM and under what terms and conditions constitutes, therefore, 
an important and difficult strategic choice for the Central American countries, particularly given 
mixed feelings about the past performance of the proposed customs union. Since its inception, the 
CACM was expected to be an instrument to promote these countries' economic growth and mod-
ernization. In effect, in order to deepen their process of import-substitution industrialization, given 
their small domestic markets, the Central American countries tried to reach economies of scale 
through the preferential opening of their markets to the regional members. 
In those earlier days, the CACM unfortunately incorporat~d a protectionist approach em-
bedded in high levels of effective protection of production for the domestic market, discriminatory 
practices, and complex regulations. Regional integration simply replicated each country's distorted 
inward-oriented policies. Because it provided almost across-the-board free trade among its 
members, however, the CACM was comparatively "successful" in expanding intra-regional trade 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, but its internal contradictions, coupled with unmanageable extemal 
shocks, led to the disintegration of the common market in the early 1980s. 
In the mid-1980s, in response to the region's financial and economic crisis, the Central 
American countries began the liberalization of their commercial policies, adopting more outward-
looking strategies of development, coupled with economic stabilization and the privatization of 
public enterprises. Thus, recent efforts to revitalize the CACM have acknowledged the need to 
protect the international competitiveness of domestic firms and have taken place within a context 
of export promotion (Salazar Xirinach, 1994). This approach has reflected the worldwide charac-
teristic of the new wave of regionalism "based on open trade compared to the first regionalization 
based on protection" (Bhagwati, 1992, p. 542). 
Gert Rosenthal (1993) has also insisted in the concept that the ideal of a multilaterally open 
world economy, without artificial barriers to free trade in goods and services, does not exclude 
the gains from integration efforts. Moreover, such endeavors may actually contribute to the ulti-
mate free trade goal. In his view, given the extent of reciprocal trade in Central Ameri!::?., 
similarity of productive structures, and geographical proximity, the formation of a free trade area 
must be complemented with a common external tariff, in order to discourage smuggling and to 
avoid unnecessary distortions in resource allocation. Similarly important is the coordination of 
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macroeconomic policies, as sharp disparities in real exchange rates, real interest rates, and domes-
tic rates of taxation have consequences similar to those of different tariff rates. 
There are strong historical reasons for open regionalism and for the strengthening of a free 
trade area to be a natural policy choice in Central America. Difficult strategic questions arise, 
however, in determining how ambitious the integration scheme should be beyond the free trade 
area and how many of their scarce managerial resources (trade policy teams) should the count1ics 
devote to regional processes and institution building. 
On the one hand, there are reasons not to overemphasize the deepening of the CACM. Not 
only are the Central American economies too small (violating criterion I), but they are not 
necessarily "natural" trading partners. Rather, from the perspective of their very similar pro-
ductive structures, they are more like clones of each other (with limited opportunities for profit-
able trade in the absence of some protection, thus violating criterion IT). Indeed, there may be too 
few goods for which another member of the CACM is the lowest-cost external source of supply 
for any one of them. These are precisely the reasons why the CACM was so attractive in the past 
as a protectionist tool. With full unilateral liberalization it could become irrelevant. 
On the other hand, geographical proximity and a common history may induce low transac-
tion costs, that may create localized opportunities to trade. This is clearly the case between 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. The question is: will high volumes of efficient intra-
regional trade survive a substantial lowering of protection through unilateral liberalization? The 
optimistic expectation is that such geographical (and other dimensions) of proximity will lower 
costs sufficiently for the regional trade to continue to be an attractive opportunity in obtaining the 
gains from trade for these countries. There are no clear answers to this empirical question. 
Specific investment in the physical and institutional infrastructure that would make this continued 
trade possible is an attractive option, but it must be subject to rigorous cost-benefit analysis. 
While the list of products not subject to free trade in Central America is short, non-ta:iff 
barriers to trade have proliferated (Monge Gonzalez, 1995). Strategic actions should focus on the 
elimination of these obstacles and extension of the free trade status to services. 
XI. Going After the Key United States Market 
The United States continues to be the largest single trading partner for the Central Amer-
ican countries. About two-fifths of Central American exports are sold in the United States and 
over 45 percent of imports come from this country. On the basis of criterion I, therefore, Central 
American policymakers should pay particular attention to improving access to the U.S. market 
and should target it as a main locus of their concerns. 
Preferential access to the U.S. market had been provided in the past by the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative. Some see this mechanism as most desirable, as access to the U.S. market is not 
conditioned on similar degrees of access to the Central American markets for U.S. products 
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(asymmetric trade barriers). Given the strong arguments for unilateral trade liberalization pre-
sented in this paper, however, such asymmetry is not necessarily critical. What ultimately matters 
is the reduction of U.S. barriers to imports from the Central American countries, equivalent to 
an improvement of their international terms of trade. 
Negotiation of NAFTA eroded the comparative gains from preferential CBI access vis-a-
vis Mexican competitors. Some efforts may be spent in lobbying the U.S. Congress for the ap-
proval of the Crane bill and equivalent unilateral measures that would guarantee CBI countries 
treatment similar to that accorded to Mexico. In the long-term this is not a satisfactory arrange-
ment, however, given the political vulnerability of the annual congressional approval required. 
Even if continuation were to be expected, this transitory system does not offer sufficient certainty 
to investors interested in exports to the U.S. market (Lizano, 1994). Rather than insisting on its 
continuation, the Central American countries should focus their attention on preparing for the Free 
Trade Area for the Americas announced in Miami. 
XII. The Multiplication of Free Trade Agreements 
In recent years, Latin America has seen a virtual proliferation of free trade agreements, 
ranging from the resurrection of the Andean Group, with the establishment of a free trade zon~ 
starting in 1992, to the formation of Mercosur (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil) in 
1991, the Group of Three (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico), and NAFTA as well as bilateral 
agreements, such as those between Mexico with Chile and with Bolivia. The Central American 
countries have not been immune to this process. Costa Rica signed a bilateral agreement with 
Mexico, to be followed by the other countries. 
This multiplication of bilateral and trilateral free trade agreements poses difficult strategic 
questions to Central American policymakers. On the one hand, there are costs of being left be-
hind, if all other countries are participating in them. On the other hand, numerous free trade 
agreements impose high costs to the countries involved (as this strategy violates most of the cri-
teria adopted in this paper for an efficient movement towards freer trade). 
In order to minimize costs of the transition, it is desirable to move as close to the confi-
guration of the flnal preferred solution as rapidly as possible (criterion III). Each intermediate step 
is costly from several perspectives. In terms of resource allocation efficiency, the trade diversion 
effects of violations of the most favored nation principle reduce the country's welfare. In terms 
of adjustment costs, the structure of effective protection associated with each intermediate step 
redirects resources to new uses, only in a transitory manner. This is particularly costly if 
investment is not reversible and if there is not perfect mobility of factors of production. The 
numerous political negotiations required waste valuable resources in directly unproductive activity 
and provide opportunities for protectionist views to influence the arrangements made. 
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Individual negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements represent substantial (transaction) 
costs to the small commercial policy teams of the Central American countries and may actually 
induce delays in the process of reaching free trade status (violating criterion IV). Moreover, it is 
difficult to imagine that such arrangements with weak partners would be suitable loci for the 
learning processes and increased preparedness that are required to fully participate in more wide-
ranging trade agreements, such as NAFTA (thus contradicting criterion V). 
The Protocolo de Guatemala, approved in October, 1993 to update and modernize the Tra-
tado General de Integraci6n Econ6mica, is a very general legal instrument which does not defme 
clear strategies for the process of trade liberalization in the region. As a result, commitment to 
a common external tariff has not been honored. The formation of the customs union is 
incompatible, in particular, with the bilateral negotiation of FTAs with members from outside the 
CACM (Salazar Xirinachs, 1994). If indeed there is no commitment to the joint negotiations 
required by the customs union, perhaps the authorities should concentrate their efforts in 
improving a free trade area for Central America and adopt well-defined rules of origin. 
The greatest danger for Central America would be a fragmentation of the Western hemi-
sphere into a small number of subregions, one of them the CACM next to other larger groups, 
such as NAFTA, Mercosur, and the Andean Group. Even together, the Central American coun-
tries constitute a very small market, much smaller tha11 any of the economic spaces covered by 
the other FTAs. While firms in the other trade blocks would be able to lower their cost curves by 
reaching economies of scale and taking advantage of greater degrees of specialization and division 
of labor, the small CACM would have clear disadvantages in this dynamic framework. 
Such a fragmented hemisphere, diverting trade away from Central America toward the 
members of each FT A, while keeping enough degrees of protection to maintain Central American 
products out, would be the worst of all worlds for Central American policymakers. This is one 
of the dangers, however, of emphasizing strengthening of the CACM, even if only as a vehicle 
to gain access to larger free trade areas. This may be inevitable, nevertheless, given the reluctance 
of potential partners (in particular the United States) to negotiate individually with each country, 
given the high transaction and political costs involved. 
XIII. The Road Ahead 
This paper has attempted to assess alternative commercial policy options for the Central 
American countries, while taking into account the constraints and uncertainties faced by policy-
makers in a rapidly changing economic and political environment. In particular, among key recent 
changes in their external environment, the creation of NAFTA introduced both new threats and 
new hopes for the Central American countries. On the one hand, it occasioned instances of trade 
diversion and investment diversion away from Central America. On the other hand, it was seen 
as a first step toward the formation of a hemispheric free trade area. It bolstered, in any case, the 
political strength of trade liberalizing circles in Central America. 
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As a consequence of these events, however, the Central American countries now face a 
more difficult set of policy options. This is due, in part, to the proliferation of second-best situa-
tions, given the variegation of trade regimes that prevail, with their multiple divergences from the 
most favored nation principle. It is due, in addition, to increased uncertainties about the future 
rules of the game and about the intennediate steps required before hemispheric free trade actually 
prevails. 
Given the overwhelming importance of the dynamic benefits from free trade, there is no 
doubt about the desired general direction of policy refonns and infrastructure building, even in 
the presence of domestic distortions. The Central American countries are so small, for every 
economically relevant meaning of the term, that they must basically take free trade as given, as 
an inevitable facet of their initial conditions. They must focus, in tum, their energies on increasing 
their competitiveness and the flexibility of their economies. They must resolve, in addition, 
questions about how to strategically proceed in their trade liberalization efforts. 
The design and implementation of new commercial policies, the management of interna-
tionally competitive firms, the construction of physical and institutional infrastructures to facilitate 
trade, and the quest for macroeconomic stability require capable and experienced managerial 
teams, both in the private and the public sector. Because these teams are small in the Cen~ral 
American cmmtries, the allocation of their efforts to the development and implementation of al-
ternative cOii.illlercial policy options requires some economizing. 
Given the resource allocation, adjustment, political, and transaction costs of alternative 
policy options, the authorities need guidelines to make choices about the allocation of their scarce 
time and capabilities. This paper offers five basic strategic guidelines to direct them in their 
efforts, namely: 
(a) Secure access to as large a market as possible. 
(b) Rely, as much as possible, on the country's long-tenn comparative advantages. 
(c) Move as close to the expected final policy configuration as possible. 
(d) Move to the fmal solution as rapidly as possible. 
(e) Join strong rather than weak partners. 
More than any other option, unilateral trade liberalization fulfills these basic guidelines. 
It targets the world market, while it reduces the costs (in tenns of trade diversion) of some more 
limited approaches to free trade, such as participation in free trade areas. By eliminating biases 
against exports, unilateral trade liberalization is welfare improving per se, and it does not require 
complex international negotiations. Because any change in commercial policies always can ies 
important redistributional consequences, however, unilateral trade liberalization may be difficult 
in a political environment dominated by protectionist lobbies. 
Since the mid-1980s, in response to the region's economic crisis, the Central American 
countries have rapidly advanced their unilateral trade liberalization efforts, with dramatic increases 
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in their exports outside the CACM. This process should continue, toward the achievement of an 
ideal 10 percent uniform tariff, and it should encompass services and not just commodities. 
Clearly, all non-tariff barriers to trade must be eliminated, while the process of opening the capital 
account of the balance of payments must be completed. This process would take place within the 
framework of the World Trade Organization. 
Despite the potential threat of trade diversion, strengthening of the CACM as a free trade 
area seems to be a natural step for the Central American countries as well, given their geograph-
ical proximity and common historical roots. The threat of trade diversion can be minimized, 
moreover, by adopting low levels of protection against imports from the rest of the world, in the 
first place. Development of a physical and institutional infrastructure that reduces transaction cusls 
in regional trade would increase "natural" opportunities for trading and would thus eliminate 
opportunities for trade diversion as well. 
Recent efforts to revitalize the CACM, from the perspective of an "open regionalism," 
have attempted to strengthen the implicit free trade area. The consolidation of free trade in the 
region, including agricultural commodities and (fmancial and non-fmancial) services, should be 
accomplished. Similarly important is the development of more efficient payments mechanisms, 
including the operations of the Fondo Centroamericano de Estabilizaci6n Monetaria. Competition 
must be promoted by removing existing repressive domestic regulations and through the har-
monization of tax rules. Regional infrastructure projects will contribute to a reduction of 
transaction costs. 
The strategic choices become more complicated if the purpose is to transform the CACM 
from a free trade area into a customs union or a deeper type of integration which included coordi-
nation of macroeconomic policies. Although there may be clear advantages from coordination, 
there are no clear answers about how to proceed when not all the countries want to move in the 
same direction and at the same speed. The situation is further complicated by the recent 
proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements which, in some instances, contradict the rules of 
the CACM as a customs union. If the national managerial teams have their hands full, there 
should be limits to how much to devote their efforts to the (small) Central American market. Their 
main task should be to get the country "ready" to participate in the more broad hemispheric free 
trade arrangements of the future. 
Multiple negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements is clearly a suboptimal strategy, 
while not much hope must be placed in the continuation of preferential arrangements such as the 
CBI. The proliferation of free trade agreements that violate the most favored nation principle not 
only create complex second-best scenarios, but impose high adjustment and transaction costs. 
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